, and H n be the set of all functions from
Introduction
Random generation is of supreme importance for cryptography, and has recently received extensive investigation by many computer scientists [GGM] [S] [Y] . As mentioned in [LR] , if polynomial-time computable pseudorandom invertible permutations are available, then we can design ideal secret-key block ciphers that are provably secure against the chosen plaintext attack. This paper also deals with the permutations ψ(f k 3 , f j 2 , f i 1 ) where i, j, k ∈ N and f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ H n such that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ 3, either f s = f t or f s is independent of f t . We also investigate generalizations of our main result.
Notion of Pseudorandomness
Let n ∈ N. An oracle circuit T n is an acyclic circuit which contains, in addition to ordinary AND, OR, NOT and constant gates, also a particular kind of gates -oracle gates. Each oracle gate has an n-bit input and an n-bit output, and it is evaluated using some function from H n . The output of T n , a single bit, is denoted by T n [f ] when a function f ∈ H n is used to evaluate the oracle gates. The size of T n is the total number of connections in it. Note that one can view an oracle circuit as a circuit with no inputs or as a circuit with inputs to which constants are assigned.
A family of circuits T = {T n | n ∈ N } is called a statistical test for functions if each T n is an oracle circuit whose size is bounded by some polynomial in n.
Assume that S n is a multi-set consisting of functions from H n . Let S = {S n | n ∈ N } and H = {H n | n ∈ N }. We say that T is a distinguisher for S if for some polynomial P and for infinitely many n, we have |P r{T n [s] = 1} − P r{T n [h] = 1}| ≥ 1/P (n), where s∈ R S n and h∈ R H n . We say that S is pseudorandom if there is no distinguisher for it. (See also [GGM] , [LR] and [Y] .)
In this paper we are only concerned with pseudorandom permutations, i.e., pseudorandom functions S = {S n | n ∈ N } where each S n consists of permutations from H n . It is convenient to say that an s∈ R S n is pseudorandom whenever S is pseudorandom, and not pseudorandom (or can be distinguished from an r∈ R H n ) otherwise.
Main Result
This section proves our main result on permutations ψ(f
and (Y s1 , Y s2 
Obviously, the size of T 2n is of polynomial in n. Now we analyze the behavior of T 2n in the following two cases: CASE-1, where a function
used to evaluate the oracle gates, and CASE-2, where a function drawn randomly and uniformly from H 2n is used to evaluate the oracle gates. We show that in the former case, the probability that T 2n outputs a bit 1 is 1 and, in the latter case, the probability is less than 1/2 n−1
Denote by ∼ a string which we do not care. The inputs to and outputs of
. . , O m 1 are as follows:
and the probability that T 2n outputs a bit 1 is 1.
CASE-2: There are two sub-cases to be analyzed:
and hence (X 11 , X 12 ) = (0 . These strings are independent of (X (m 1 +1)1 , X (m 1 +1)2 ), and hence
outputs a bit 1, is 1/2 n .
Thus, for CASE-2, we have
This completes the proof.
As a consequence of Theorem 1, we know that none of ψ(f, f, f ), ψ(f, f, f 2 ) and
, f, f ), where f ∈ R H n , are pseudorandom.
Next we discuss the optimality of ψ(g, g, f ) and ψ(g, f, f ) where f, g∈ R H n .
Apparently, F 2n,f can be distinguished from an r∈ R H 2n . It was proved in [LR] that two applications of DES-like transformations cannot obtain a pseudorandom permutation.
In particular, Luby and Rackoff showed that ψ(g, f ), where f, g ∈ H n , can be easily distinguished from an r∈ R H 2n .
Thus, by putting together Theorem 1 and Ohnishi's observations mentioned above, we see that to get a pseudorandom permutation in H 2n , two independent random functions from H n and three applications of DES-like transformations are not only sufficient but also necessary, as far as our construction is restricted to the permutations
, where i, j, k ∈ N and f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ H n such that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ 3, either f s = f t or f s is independent of f t . In other words, under the above condition, pseudorandom permutations ψ(g, f, f ) and ψ (g, g, f ) proposed by Ohnishi [O] , where f, g∈ R H n , are optimal in the sense that they consist of the minimal rounds of DES-like transformations, and "consume" the minimal number of independent random functions from H n .
Generalizations
This section extends in two directions Theorem 1 to the case of generalized DES-like transformations.
Let
∈ N with ≥ 2. Following [FNS, pp.1547 [FNS, pp. -1549 and [S] , we associate
is easy to show that when s < 2 − 1, θ(f s , . . . , f 2 , f 1 ) can be distinguished from an r∈ R H n . By modifying the proof for the Main Lemma of [LR] , it can be shown that
Now we prove an impossibility result on θ(f 2 −1 , . . . , f 2 , f 1 ). For (2 − 1)
Further analysis of the proof for Theorem 2 reveals that even given ( − 1) independent random functions from H n , it is not guaranteed that one can always obtain pseudorandom permutations in H n , by (2 − 1) applications of generalized DES-like transformations. This is formally stated below.
Let i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i +1 ∈ N, and let Θ n (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i +1 ) be the multi-set consisting of
Concluding Remarks
Our consideration has been restricted to the case of ψ(f Some partial impossibility results were implied in [O] 
Assume that the output of O 2 is (Z 1 , Z 2 ). (4)T 2n outputs a bit 1 iff (X 1 , X 2 ) = (Z 2 , Z 1 ).
To the end, we pose an open problem: Prove or disprove that from one random function in H n , one can obtain in some way a pseudorandom (invertible) permutation in H 2n . 
The ith oracle gate is computed as follows:
The input is
The output is β i (ω) • γ i (ω).
Note that the same function g is applied in both the second and the third rounds of DES-like transformations of ψ (g, g, f ) . So the key point is that each input to g should be compared with all previous inputs to it, no matter which round they appear in.
The remaining portion of the proof proceeds in the same way as [LR] , with some obvious modifications introduced by the above defined B-gate i . 
